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Abstract
Improvement in the quality of education in science, technology, engineering 
and mathematics is vital to global competitiveness. The need for more effec-
tive schools and the centrality of the teacher’s role in any substantive school 
improvement plans are well known. Educators, political factions, and policy-
makers are engaged in a lively debate as to whether performance pay schemes 
or more substantial increments across the salary schedule are more likely to 
motivate teachers to boost student learning outcomes. Neither side questions 
that some type of financial incentive is necessary for robust results. Since the 
economy has made local districts less able to provide either type of financial 
incentive, this study examines whether expensive pay-related motivators are 
as essential as the current discussion would suggest. It finds that virtually cost-
free motivators such as positional respect, positive working environment, per-
sonal meaning, job security, and positive challenge may each be more effective 
in attracting, retaining, and inspiring quality teachers than any restructuring or 
improvement of financial compensation.
Keywords: 
administration; education; personnel; technology.
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A relação entre o salário e a atracção pelo trabalho, lealdade ao trabalho 
e desempenho no trabalho dos professores de Ciência, Tecnologia, 
Engenharia e Matemática de alta qualidade  
Resumo: Melhorar a qualidade da educação em ciência, tecnologia, engenharia e matemática é vital para a 
competitividade global. A necessidade de escolas mais eficazes e a centralidade do papel do professor em 
quaisquer planos de melhoria substancial da escola são bem conhecidos. Educadores, facções políticas 
e decisores políticos estão envolvidos num intenso debate sobre se são os sistemas de remuneração por 
desempenho ou aumentos substanciais em toda a tabela salarial que são mais susceptíveis de motivar os 
professores para melhorar os resultados da aprendizagem dos alunos. Nenhum dos lados questiona que algum 
tipo de incentivo financeiro é necessário para obter resultados robustos. Uma vez que a economia tem tornado 
as autarquias locais menos capazes de fornecer qualquer destes tipos de incentivo financeiro, este estudo 
procurar examinar se os dispendiosos factores de motivação salariais são tão essenciais como parece sugerir 
este debate. Mostra-se que factores de motivação virtualmente livre de custos, tais como respeito profissional, 
ambiente de trabalho positivo, realização pessoal, segurança no trabalho e desafio positivo, podem ser mais 
eficazes para atrair, reter e inspirar professores de qualidade do que qualquer reestruturação ou melhoria de 
compensação financeira.
Palavras-chave: administração; educação; pessoal; tecnologia
La relation entre le salaire et l’attraction pour le travail, la loyauté au 
travail et le rendement au travail des enseignants de sciences, technologie, 
ingénierie et mathématique de haute qualité
Résumé: Amélioration de la qualité de l’éducation en science, technologie, ingénierie et mathématiques 
est vitale à la compétitivité mondiale. La nécessité des écoles plus efficaces et la centralité du rôle de 
l’enseignant dans quelques plans de fond d’amélioration des écoles sont bien connues. Les éducateurs, les 
factions politiques et les décideurs politiques sont engagés dans un vif débat quant à savoir si les régimes 
de rémunération au rendement ou incréments substantiels dans l’échelle des salaires sont plus susceptibles 
de motiver les enseignants à améliorer les résultats d’apprentissage des étudiants. Aucune des deux parties 
met en doute qu’un certain type d’incitation financière est nécessaire pour obtenir des résultats robustes. 
Puisque l’économie a fait que les mairies sont moins capables de fournir quelques-uns de ces types d’incitation 
financière, cette étude examine si les élevés coûts entraînés par des motivations liées à la rémunération sont 
aussi essentiels comme le débat actuel suggère. On constate que des facteurs de motivation virtuellement 
libres de coûts, comme le respect professionnel, environnement de travail positif, réussite personnelle, sécurité 
d’emploi et défi positif peuvent être plus efficaces pour attirer, retenir et inspirer des enseignants de qualité 
que toute restructuration ou amélioration de compensation financière.
Mots-clés: administration; éducation; personnel; technologie
La relación entre el salario y la atracción por el trabajo, lealtad al trabajo 
y desempeño en el trabajo de los profesores de Ciencia, Tecnología, 
Ingeniería y Matemática de alta calidad
Resumen: Mejorar la calidad de la educación en ciencia, tecnología, ingeniería y matemática es vital para la 
competitividad global. La necesidad de escuelas más eficaces y la centralidad del rol del profesor en cualquier 
plan de mejora sustancial de la escuela son bien conocidos. Los educadores, responsables políticos y facciones 
políticas están comprometidos en un intenso debate sobre si son los sistemas de remuneración por rendimiento 
o aumentos sustanciales en toda la escala salarial que son más propensos a motivar a los profesores para 
mejorar los resultados de aprendizaje de los estudiantes. Ninguna de las partes cuestiona que algún tipo de 
incentivo económico es necesario para obtener resultados sólidos. Una vez que la economía ha hecho las 
autoridades locales menos capaces de proporcionar cualquiera de estos tipos de incentivos financieros, este 
estudio pretende examinar si estos dispendiosos factores de motivación salarial son tan esenciales como 
parece sugerir este debate. Se muestra que factores de motivación virtualmente gratuitos, como respeto 
profesional, ambiente de trabajo positivo, desarrollo personal, seguridad en el trabajo y desafío positivo, 
pueden ser más eficaces en atraer, retener e inspirar los profesores de calidad que cualquier reestructuración 
o mejora de compensación financiera.
Palabras clave: administración; educación; personal; tecnología
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1. Introduction
The attitude of the American public on paying STEM schoolteachers is little 
short of bipolar. One passionately-held view sees many teachers as minimally-
skilled, lacking a deep commitment to excellence, and stupendously failing to 
produce a globally-competitive workforce. This group views the teaching pro-
fession as successful only in building politically astute labor unions that cajole 
state and local governments into paying them far more than their (presumed) 
one hundred eighty five days of annual effort are worth. The group resonates 
with editorials like the Wall Street Journal’s “Is $34.06 Per Hour ‘Underpaid’?” 
(Greene & Winters, 2007a).
An equally fervent block of voters consider our teachers to be the unfairly 
maligned foot soldiers of democracy. They have only praise for the dedication 
of those who manage to instill personal ethics, patriotic ideals, and basic skills 
into a generation of young people who come to them with less preparation, 
less family support, less emotional stability, less respect for authority, less self-
sufficiency, and a higher degree of entitlement than ever before. This group be-
lieves that our teachers have done so much, with so little, so quickly, and for so 
long, that society now unreasonably expects them to do everything with noth-
ing by yesterday. They resonate with columns like the New York Times’ recent 
“Pay Teachers More!” (Kristof, 2001).
Considering that American public schools spend more than $197 billion dol-
lars a year on salaries excluding benefits (Podgursky & Springer, 2011), it is not 
surprising that the debate about what that money is actually buying can get a 
little heated. Only by dispassionately examining the relationship between qual-
ity teaching and teacher compensation can we hope to tune out the drama from 
both poles and build a data-driven method for determining how and how much 
society should pay teachers. Without data, the two camps will continue to pass 
each other without engaging, like ships in the night.
2. The Teacher Matters Most
Any discussion of the relationship of STEM teacher pay to learning outcomes 
must begin by acknowledging that there is a problem to be solved and teachers 
must be at the center of solving it. Klein (2011) provides a sampling of the large 
mass of data that establishes the need to improve learning outcomes:
• 30% of American high school students fail to graduate.
• American College Testing Service claims that 76% of our high school graduates are 
not adequately prepared for college.
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• In the latest National Assessment For Educational Progress tests, less than 33% of 
our students in grade eight were proficient in math, science, or reading.
• America ranks 48th among the developed nations in mathematics and science edu-
cation.
While there will always be apologists such as Gratz (2009), who dismiss-
es such facts the result of confusing learning metrics with ”real achievement” 
(which he does not clearly define), the debate has generally shifted from wheth-
er a problem exists to how to solve it.
Policymakers have assumed that the way to get great teachers to do high 
quality work where they are most needed is to pay them very well to do so. The 
law of supply and demand suggests that better pay should have three benefits:
• Encouraging more energetic and academically capable undergraduates to consider 
teaching careers (Auguste, Kihn, & Miller, 2010).
• Providing the incentive for the most capable teachers to stay in teaching (Cham-
berlin, Wragg, Haynes & Wragg, 2002).
• Inspiring current teachers to do a more effective job in the classroom. (Robbins, 
1999).
School districts can improve teacher pay by raising the steps of their salary 
schedule, instituting some form of pay-for-performance, or a combination of both.
3. Limitations of Across-The-Schedule Salary Increments
The across-the-schedule option suffers from inherent unfairness, a miscon-
ception about the presumed inadequacy of current teacher salaries, and un-
tested assumptions about the marketability of teachers outside the teaching 
profession.
Step-and-level salary schedules were created with the best of intentions. 
They were meant to eliminate previous salary discrimination against female 
teachers (Koppich & Rigby, 2009). They guaranteed that traditionally female 
teaching jobs (such as elementary grades) were compensated the same as tra-
ditionally male teaching jobs (such as high school mathematics and science).
Across-the-schedule raises reinforce the inherent unfairness of step-and-
level salary schedules by systematically widening the compensation gap 
between talented young teachers with Bachelor’s degrees and to their en-
trenched, but sometimes less effective, colleagues. These schedules reward 
college coursework and years of experience, neither of which has much to do 
with student achievement. No consistent relationship has been found linking 
an increase in student knowledge or skills to being in the presence of teachers 
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with Master’s degrees, with the possible exception of science and mathematics 
(Duncan, 2011). Nor does student learning correlate to how long teachers have 
been teaching beyond a teacher’s initial break-in period of three to five years 
(Hanushek & Rivkin, 2004, 2006). 
Public expenditure watchdog groups cite data suggesting that teacher com-
pensation is already more than fair and more than competitive. Data points such 
as these from the Manhattan Institute of Policy Research (Greene & Winters, 
2007b) ring true to many Americans squeezed the current recession:
• The government Bureau of Labor Statistics claims that the average American public 
school teacher earned $34.06 per hour in 2005.
• The average public school teacher was paid 36% more per hour than the average 
non-sales white-collar worker and 11% more than the average professional tech-
nical worker.
• Compared with public school teachers, editors and reporters earn 24% less; archi-
tects 11% less; psychologists 9% less; chemists 5% less; mechanical engineers 
6% less; and economists 1% less.
One might also ask why, if teacher salaries are so bad, are so many mid-
career business and industry professionals signing up for alternative teacher 
certification programs in the hope of landing second careers in the very tight 
teaching job market? 
The relevance of comparing teacher pay to industry pay depends on another 
question. Do teachers have the skills that business and industry values and will 
pay for? If not, even the best teachers are unlikely to be able to leave the class-
room for higher salaries elsewhere. 
Aside from issues of fairness, salaries compared to those in business and in-
dustry, and the unlikelihood of many teachers having the skills to jump to a soft 
landing in private sector employment, there are several additional problems 
with across-the-schedule salary increases (Holley, 2008):
• High across-the-schedule salaries would encourage mediocre teachers to stay in 
the profession as much as exceptional ones, squeezing out the very bright young 
professional teachers that the higher salaries were intended to attract.
• Automatic salary increases based on longevity would attract risk-averse candi-
dates who might not have confidence in their ability to succeed in a performance-
based system.
• If salaries are increased in areas that are already over-supplied, like elementary 
teaching, there will be fewer dollars to attract strong candidates in high need 
 areas, like secondary science and math.
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For all these reasons, as well as the simple fact that the economy makes 
significant new spending for any public employees unlikely, across-the-sched-
ule increases will be meager for the foreseeable future. If teacher pay is to be 
made a more effective tool for improving student learning outcomes, it must be 
through some form of performance pay.
4. Does Performance Pay Work?
Performance pay is any compensation scheme that rewards merit, value, and 
productivity, as measured by professional observations, peer evaluations, su-
pervisor judgment, student test scores, and other standards. (Hess, 2010). The 
term sometimes includes extra pay used to attract exceptional talent to teach 
hard-to-find subjects or work in hard-to-staff schools (Viadero, 2011). Such in-
centives are more accurately called differential pay and will be excluded from 
our discussion.
Performance pay schemes often enlarge the total salary pool. Millions of 
dollars have been given to performance pay schemes by both the Federal gov-
ernment and private organizations, such as the Milliken Foundation. In Denver, 
taxpayers accepted substantial tax increases to fund performance pay schemes 
where they almost certainly would have rejected tax hikes to fund across-the-
schedule pay raises for teachers (Dillon, 2008; Holley, 2008). 
Performance pay with true accountability is particularly attractive when 
contrasted to salary improvement schemes which have no connection to stu-
dent learning. For example, the National Council on Teacher Quality (2008) rec-
ommends that districts give a significant salary boost to teachers when they 
receive tenure “provided tenure is based on sufficient data to determine ef-
fectiveness”. This idea has not been popular with school districts, and that ex-
tra clause is precisely the problem. Tenure in K-12 school districts is almost 
never based on sufficient data to determine effectiveness. In fact, it is rare to 
have “effectiveness” even defined at the school district level. In the absence 
of measurable standards, there is no reason to believe that a newly tenured 
teacher with five years of experience is any better at improving student learn-
ing outcomes than an untenured teacher with four years of experience.
There is surprisingly little data to confirm or refute that performance pay 
works (Dufferin, 2011). Many of the experiments were too short-lived to yield 
results worthy of confidence. The building of a performance pay plan is a pro-
foundly political activity. Every sponsoring state, foundation, and district must 
engage in a consensus-building process to fashion a plan that it hopes will 
 appeal to a unique collection of diverse local stakeholders. No sponsor has 
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replicated anyone else’s plan with the objective of confirming earlier findings 
about what works and what doesn’t. Several plans measure and reward perfor-
mance in such unique ways that it would be hard to use their findings to predict 
what might happen in other districts (Dee & Keys, 2004; Lavy, 2007).
Only a few plans, such as the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program 
(Springer, et al., 2010), were sufficiently randomized to eliminate the possibil-
ity that the self-selection of teachers and students into the program significant-
ly skewed the results. Figlio and Kenny (2007) note that when whole schools 
within a district are given the choice of opting into a performance pay plan, it is 
often the most effective and innovative schools that opt in. It may well be that 
this self-selection, rather than the plan itself, drives the plan’s apparent success 
in impacting learning outcomes. 
Performance pay plans don’t succeed or fail in a vacuum. A sense of be-
ing well compensated and fairly compensated is a necessary condition to bring 
about the benefits that performance pay plans seek, but not a sufficient one 
(Koppich & Rigby, 2009).Without other supports, such as improved evaluation 
and better professional development, these plans have no effect on learning 
(Dufferin, 2011). Many factors, such as effective administration and congenial 
working conditions, must also be present.
If the available data doesn’t establish that performance pay plans work, nei-
ther does it confirm that they don’t. For example, we know that the Chicago 
Teacher Advancement performance pay program (Glazerman & Seifullah, 2010) 
and the recent performance pay program in New York City public schools (Good-
man & Turner, 2010) both failed to achieve anything approaching the expected 
results. Since each of these programs was uniquely tailored to its locality with 
rules and features unlikely to be adopted elsewhere, we cannot use them to 
predict that other programs are also likely to fail.
5. Performance Pay and Teacher Morale
We don’t know whether performance pay reliably attracts more qualified 
STEM teachers, retains these better teachers, or motivates teachers to work 
harder. Can we at least confirm that performance pay makes teachers feel better 
about their jobs and that student learning benefits from their boost in morale? 
There are four reasons why even this cannot be claimed with certainty:
1. The education profession does not agree on what teacher behaviors are essential 
to effective teaching. There is broad consensus on some elements, like sensitiv-
ity to individual student needs, but fierce debate about the relative significance 
of other factors that a textbook might list. One teacher may think a dynamic 
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 teaching personality is vital, another thinks it’s all about perceptive diagnosis of 
learning styles, and a third focuses on dogged perseverance in demanding stu-
dent effort. Still other teachers believe fine teaching is an artistic alchemy that 
can never be reduced to any list of behaviors. They claim that the true benefit of 
their teaching may take years to percolate through a student’s consciousness and 
finally manifest in adulthood as an interest pursued or a career path taken. It is 
inevitable that many teachers will feel that a given performance pay system “got 
it wrong” in not rewarding the teacher behaviors they most value. 
2. Nor are teachers more comfortable with rewarding results rather than behaviors. 
Any teacher whose students test poorly can, and probably will, claim explana-
tions other than poor teaching. This might explain why some teachers feel justi-
fied in manipulating the test scores on which their performance pay is based. 
Dessoff (2011) notes that cheating has become a serious problem with significant 
scandals in major cities such as Baltimore and Atlanta.
3. Performance pay schemes must reward either groups or individuals. Either ap-
proach can adversely affect teacher morale. Individual awards can lead to un-
friendly competition, an unwillingness to share best practices, and friction in 
the teacher’s lounge (Coates-McBride & Kritsonis, 2008; Camins, 2011). Group 
rewards can lead to an individual feeling her salary is being dragged down by her 
unlucky placement in an inferior work-group or that some group members are 
“getting a free ride” to undeserved bonuses on the strength of her efforts (Good-
man & Turner, 2010). 
4. Performance pay schemes can force teachers to either teach in a way they find 
uncomfortable or lose out on extra pay. The most common complaint is being 
forced to “teach to the test” in ways which ignore student behaviors that the 
teachers value but are not tested, like creativity and group participation. (Hess, 
2010). Some teachers feel compelled to use a triage system for allocating their 
effort. The students who are unlikely to improve their test scores much even with 
a huge amount of teacher assistance get minimal attention. The students whose 
scores are sure to rise with or without much teacher assistance are also left to 
their own devices. Students who the teacher judges can improve their scores 
enough to affect the teacher’s performance rating, but only if the teacher invests 
considerable time in preparing them for the test, are the only ones who get the 
attention that all students deserve (Lavy, 2007). Teachers resent being forced 
into this type of thinking.
5. Gratz (2009) notes that teachers typically come to their task with the spark of 
altruism. They are motivated by a sense of the special trust that comes from 
working with children. Performance pay creates a dilemma that can damage that 
“natural motivation” (Lavy 2007).
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6. Performance pay plans are pointless if everyone is rewarded regardless of how 
they perform. For performance pay to work, there must be winners and, by im-
plication, losers. The losers are bound to feel unappreciated and lose some of 
their motivation to perform up to their potential. If the plan has too many los-
ers compared to winners, the district-wide effect can be a net loss of motivation. 
Several researchers note that veteran teachers are often hostile to performance 
pay (Milanowski, 2007; Clabaugh, 2009; Goldhauber, DeArmond, & Deburgomas-
ter, 2011; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011). The fact that performance pay 
moves compensation from being an institutional issue to being an individual is-
sue is seen as weakening the collective bargaining clout that has achieved so 
much salary growth for the veterans over the years (Chamberlin, Wragg, Haynes 
& Wragg, 2002).
7.  Unlike younger teachers, who may overestimate the degree to which their per-
sonal efforts can contribute to test score improvement, veterans see student 
learning as the product of many factors, such their students’ innate abilities, pa-
rental support, administrative support, and the principal’s commitment to disci-
pline. They are not comfortable with having their paycheck determined by factors 
they can’t control. 
It is clearly time to revisit the core assumptions behind all this tinkering 
with teacher pay. Does how we pay teachers and how much we pay teachers re-
ally influence student learning? How much does pay matter compared to other 
incentives that school systems might find easier to equitably provide and pay 
for? If pay is not the key to better teaching and learning, what is? These are the 
areas of inquiry that drive this study.
6. Research Methodology
Policymakers need to focus on attracting the most promising candidates to 
teaching, retaining the best teachers, and inspiring all teachers to give their 
best effort all the time. This suggests six research questions:
1. What is the relationship between substantial across-the-schedule salary increas-
es and attracting the most promising candidates to teaching STEM subjects?
2. What is the relationship between performance pay and attracting the most prom-
ising candidates to teaching STEM subjects?
3. What is the relationship between substantial across-the-schedule salary increas-
es and retaining the best performing STEM teachers?
4. What is the relationship between performance pay and retaining the best per-
forming STEM teachers?
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5. What is the relationship between substantial across-the-schedule salary increas-
es and obtaining maximum effort from STEM teachers?
6. What is the relationship between performance pay and obtaining maximum ef-
fort from STEM teachers?
The twenty-five research subjects are candidates for the Masters of Educa-
tion degree in Instructional Design & Technology at West Texas A&M University 
in Canyon, Texas. All are certified as teachers with an average experience of 
seven years. This program is exceptionally demanding by local standards. Its 
participants include some of the most capable teachers that any district could 
wish to attract, retain, and inspire. Since the financial rewards of the M.Ed. are 
relatively modest in the schools of the Texas Panhandle, many subjects are tak-
ing the degree mostly to improve their skill set. 
The subjects identified themselves as being members of one of two groups. 
The first group is Totally Committed to Teaching (TCT) in the K-12 public schools. 
They are currently teaching or actively seeking a return to teaching after a budg-
etary layoff. The second group is Not Totally Committed to Teaching (NTCT) in 
the K-12 public schools. This group is open to using their teaching and technical 
skills in business, industry, government, consulting, or self-employment. Some 
members are very serious about moving out of K-12 and see the program as the 
springboard to doing so. A few have already made the transition to business and 
industry. Others would be equally happy in a K-12 or non-K-12 position that met 
their needs. 
This study compares the effectiveness of substantial across-the-schedule 
salary increases and performance pay to six other motivators in attracting, re-
taining, and inspiring teaching talent. Several of these factors were first identi-
fied in the McKinsey Report (Auguste, Kihn, & Miller, 2010):
a. Substantial Across-The-Schedule Salary Increases (SATSSI). Such increases 
would affect the amount of pay that can be expected by anyone taking a position 
and the amount of growth in pay that can be expected over time. To be effective, 
such increases must exceed the rate of inflation by a significant margin.
b. Performance Pay. This is the extent to which an individual can improve their per-
sonal pay through demonstrated excellence. In the teaching profession, excel-
lence is usually measured by some combination of subjective methods, such as 
supervisor evaluations, and objective methods, such as improvement in student 
test scores.
c. Positional Respect. This is the extent to which society admires members of a pro-
fession. Doctors typically enjoy very high positional respect. Retail clerks do not. 
While respect from parents reflects the attitudes of society at large and respect 
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(or lack of it) from students is a product of the students’ developmental stage, 
the research subjects tend to conflate the two when responding to items about 
Positional Respect.
d. Positive Working Environment. This is the extent to which the workplace is 
pleasant and congenial. The most important element in Positive Working Envi-
ronment is belonging to a group of highly-valued colleagues (Skaalvik & Skaal-
vik, 2011). Other elements include the perceived support of administration, and 
physical comforts, such as whether the building is maintained at a reasonable 
temperature.
e. Technology Environment. This is whether the hardware, software, and peripheral 
devices (such as printers) used on the job are up-to-date, in good repair, and well-
supported.
f. Personal Meaning. This is whether the position is perceived by the employee 
as being of true service, if only in some small way, to the locality, state, nation, 
and the progress of Man. In the Texas Panhandle, such a position would often be 
considered a “calling” as much as a way to make a living. Altruistic jobs, such as 
working with the homeless, are likely to be high in personal meaning. Personal 
meaning cannot be assigned to a position by anyone other than the holder of the 
position. One school secretary might consider her role to be rich with personal 
meaning and another might consider the same job to be totally devoid of it.
g. Job Security. This is the perceived likelihood that the position will be immune to 
budgetary layoffs for the foreseeable future. 
h. Positive Challenge. This is the degree to which the position demands the best 
that the employee has to offer. It includes such elements as high organizational 
standards, engaged helpful supervision, demanding but fair employee evalua-
tion, and abundant opportunities for meaningful professional development. 
The research instrument consists of three sections of 28 items each: one sec-
tion on attracting quality candidates to a new position, one section on retain-
ing valued employees in their current positions, and one section on inspiring 
maximum effort and enthusiasm from current staff.  As shown in Table 1, each 
item consists of a pair of sentences corresponding to two of the eight listed 
motivators. 
Two sample sentences for each motivator from the survey section on attract-
ing quality candidates to a new position.    
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MoTIvAToR SAMPLE SEnTEnCES fRoM THE RESEARCH InSTRuMEnT
1-Substantial 
Across-The-
Salary Schedule 
Increases 
(SATSSI)
Bringing home a good salary would be very important to me in a new 
job.
There is no point in entering a field that doesn’t pay well.
2-Performance 
Pay
I want my job to pay me for the quality of my personal contribution.
I wouldn’t want to work in a place where low-quality performers get 
the same pay as hard workers.
3-Positional 
Respect
I want a profession that I can be proud to be a part of.
Teaching would be a better job in Finland, where teachers are as 
respected as lawyers and doctors.
4-Positive 
Working 
Environment
Awesome co-workers would make a new job so much more attractive
I need a job with up-beat professional people who are excited about 
what they do.
5-Technology 
Environment
I would be reluctant to take a job where they still used Microsoft 
Word 97 or Microsoft Word 2003.
I expect my future employers to consider up-to-date computer 
hardware to be a high priority.
6-Personal 
Meaning
Any future career must be part of my world view and not just a way 
to make money.
I don’t just want a new job; I want a vocation beneficial to humanity.
7-Job Security
I wouldn’t take a job unless I expected it to still be there in five 
years. 
There’s no point in moving to a career field that has a high 
likelihood of layoffs in the next economic downturn. 
8-Positive 
Challenge
I need a job that really tests how much I can contribute.
I’d like a job where my supervisors set high but fair standards. 
Table 1: Motivators and Sample Sentences
Subjects must choose the sentence from each item pair that seems most true 
for them. If they are not entirely comfortable with either choice, they still must 
choose the one they are most comfortable with. If they are strongly in agree-
ment with both choices, they still must choose the one they most strongly agree 
with. This sample item from the survey matches the Positive Challenge motiva-
tor (8) with the Performance Pay motivator (2):
Choose the sentence which most closely represents your view:
a. I’d like a job where my supervisors set high but fair standards.
b. I want my job to pay me for the quality of my personal contribution.
Since the order in which the sentences are presented is irrelevant, there are 
28 unique combinations of the eight factors in each of the three sections of 
items.
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7. Data Analysis
A sentence representing each of the eight motivators was available to be se-
lected seven times in each of the three sections. In the entire survey, each moti-
vator was represented 21 (7 x 3) times. The data was analyzed to determine how 
often the two motivators concerning pay (SATSSI and Performance Pay) were 
chosen compared the other six available motivators. The TCT and NTCT groups 
were considered both separately and together. The data was further analyzed 
to see how often the two factors concerning pay were chosen in “head-to-head 
competition” with each of the other six factors in individual item pairs as shown 
in Table 1.
8. factors in Attracting Quality STEM Candidates
Each of the 17 subjects in the TCT group responded to all 28 items in this 
section for 476 total responses. The 8 subjects in the NTCT group also respond-
ed to all the 28 items and contributed 224 total responses.
fACToRS CREATIng InTEREST In A nEW CAREER
ToTAL CoMMITTED 
To TEACHIng (TCT) 
gRouP
noT ToTALLy 
CoMMITTED To 
TEACHIng (nTCT) 
gRouP
BoTH gRouPS
MoTIvATIonAL 
fACToR
nuMBER
% of  
ToTAL
nuMBER
% of  
ToTAL
nuMBER
% of  
ToTAL
1-SATSSI 29 6.09% 17 7.59% 46 6.57%
2-Performance Pay 45 9.45% 17 7.59% 62 8.86%
3-Positional 
Respect 
61 12.82% 38 16.96% 99 14.14%
4-Positive Working 
Environment
65 13.66% 33 14.73% 98 14.00%
5-Technology 
Environment
48 10.08% 22 9.82% 70 10.00%
6-Personal Meaning 85 17.86% 37 16.52% 122 17.43%
7-Job Security 66 13.87% 29 12.95% 95 13.57%
8-Positive 
Challenge
77 16.18% 31 13.84% 108 15.43%
Total 476 100.00% 224 100.00% 700 100.00%
Table 2: Factors Creating Interest in a New Career
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Table 2 offers no support for the idea that either SATSSI or Performance 
Pay would be likely to induce quality teachers to move to new careers outside 
of teaching. For both the subjects who are not considering a move outside of 
teaching (TCT) and for those who are (NTCT), the two pay-related motivators are 
the least potent of all eight. For both groups taken together, five of the six moti-
vators that are not concerned with pay attracted more than double the response 
that SATSSI did.
Part of the reason that teachers may not be thinking of leaving teaching to 
improve their pay is their lack of confidence in their personal marketability 
outside the classroom. They may well believe that they are doing as well finan-
cially right now as they are ever likely to do, even with the enhanced technology 
skill set they are gaining from their M.Ed. program. One subject put it this way: 
“I’ve decided to change my profession because I can’t stand the bureaucracy 
anymore, but I haven’t changed who I am. I wasn’t a money-driven person as a 
teacher and I won’t be a money-driven person in my next career either. “
Note that in Table 2, performance pay, though weak as a motivator for career 
change, still bests simply improving the salary schedule by almost 50% for the 
TCT group. This may reflect the fact that these tech-savvy teachers consider 
themselves to be stronger performers than their peers and more likely benefit 
from performance pay. NTCTs are apparently less confident about their ability 
to compete with the peers they anticipate having in business or industry.
An interesting finding is the primacy of the search for personal meaning 
in work. This is a very high motivator in the NTCT group and an even higher 
motivator in the TCT group. The common assumption is that people become 
teachers, in spite of relatively low pay, precisely because it offers a sense of 
mission. Apparently, these experienced teachers have found the public school 
classroom somewhat disappointing in that department. If anything were ever to 
attract them to a new career, it would be the chance to find personal meaning 
elsewhere.
Of the five top motivators (Personal Meaning, Positive Challenge, Positional 
Respect, Positive Working Environment, Job Security), only one has any direct 
cost. That would be the professional development aspect of the Positive Chal-
lenge motivator. 
It is surprising that these technology Master’s candidates rank Technology 
Environment down in the sixth position among the eight options, higher only 
than the two pay-related options, as a motivator for changing careers. Perhaps, 
as teachers, they have gotten by with less-than-ideal computer equipment for 
so long that they cannot conceive of the benefits of having high caliber tools.
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9. factors Inspiring Loyalty to Present Position
As illustrated in Table 3, once again, subjects think it only minimally likely 
that they would be motivated by pay considerations to stay in a job if they were 
already considering leaving it. When both groups are considered, both SATSSI 
and Performance Pay rank behind four of the other six motivators by a roughly 
2:1 margin. The difference between SATSSI and Performance Pay has now been 
eliminated from the TCT group. This is probably because they are career teach-
ers who think much pay improvement in any form is unlikely after many years of 
raises in the 2% range. They stay for other reasons.
fACToRS CREATIng LoyALTy To PRESEnT CAREER
ToTAL CoMMITTED 
To 
TEACHIng (TCT) 
gRouP
noT ToTALLy 
CoMMITTED To 
TEACHIng (nTCT) 
gRouP
BoTH gRouPS
MoTIvATIonAL 
fACToR
nuMBER % of  
ToTAL
nuMBER % of  
ToTAL
nuMBER % of  
ToTAL
1-SATSSI 46 9.66% 29 12.95% 75 10.71%
2-Performance Pay 46 9.66% 19 8.48% 65 9.29%
3-Positional 
Respect 
47 9.87% 20 8.93% 67 9.57%
4-Working 
Environment
81 17.02% 33 14.73% 114 16.29%
5-Technology 
Environment
37 7.77% 18 8.04% 55 7.86%
6-Personal 
Meaning
76 15.97% 36 16.07% 112 16.00%
7-Job Security 69 14.50% 37 16.52% 106 15.14%
8-Positive 
Challenge
74 15.55% 32 14.29% 106 15.14%
Total 476 100.00% 224 100.00% 700 100.00%
Table 3: Factors Creating Loyalty to Present Career
The TCT group members are also much less likely to choose Positional Re-
spect as a reason to stay in their current teaching positions than they are to 
choose it as a possible motivator for a career change (see Table 2). They are 
probably conflating their degree of respect from society at large with the de-
gree of respect they get (or do not get) from their students on a daily basis, and 
have determined that Positional Respect is never going to be a reason to stay 
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in teaching. Instead, they will stay because of Personal Meaning, Job Security, 
Positive Challenge, and Positive Working Environment.
The NTCT group, who are already thinking about a move, imagine they might 
be more loyal to a future job which pays somewhat better, but even for this 
group, SATSSI still ranks fifth of eight factors inspiring loyalty. They do not think 
Performance Pay is likely to inspire their loyalty, again because they may be 
unsure about how they will stack up against their future colleagues in the non-
K-12 workplace. It is also not surprising that they hope future loyalty will be 
inspired by Job Security. Several shared in follow-up interviews that it was the 
immediate threat of a lay-off that motivated some of this group to try to im-
prove their marketability with a Master’s in Instructional Design & Technology 
to begin with.
10. factors Inspiring Enthusiasm and Effort in Current Position
It is axiomatic in the business world that compensation plays a large role in 
motivating maximum effort and enthusiasm from employees. If neither SATS-
SI nor Performance Pay would be effective in keeping high quality teachers in 
teaching, would either at least contribute to getting the most effort or enthusi-
asm from them in their current classroom roles?
fACToRS CREATIng EnTHuSIASM AnD EffoRT In CuRREnT PoSITIon
ToTAL CoMMITTED 
To TEACHIng (TCT) 
gRouP
noT ToTALLy 
CoMMITTED To 
TEACHIng (nTCT) 
gRouP
ALL SuBJECTS
MoTIvATIonAL 
fACToR
nuMBER
% of 
ToTAL
nuMBER
% of 
ToTAL
nuMBER
% of 
ToTAL
1-SATSSI 48 10.08% 26 11.61% 74 10.57%
2-Performance Pay 51 10.71% 23 10.27% 74 10.57%
3-Positional Respect 36 7.56% 17 7.59% 53 7.57%
4-Positive Working 
Environment
87 18.28% 43 19.20% 130 18.57%
5-Technology 
Environment
49 10.29% 31 13.84% 80 11.43%
6-Personal Meaning 72 15.13% 29 12.95% 101 14.43%
7-Job Security 58 12.18% 27 12.05% 85 12.14%
8-Positive Challenge 75 15.76% 28 12.50% 103 14.71%
Total 476 100.00% 224 100.00% 700 100.00%
Table 4: Factors Creating Enthusiasm and Effort in Current Position
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The data suggests that pay-related motivators, as shown in Table 4, would 
again be among the least effective on the list. Although the margins are nar-
rower than in the first two tables, they are still considerable. Positive Working 
Environment gathered nearly double the response of either pay-related motiva-
tor as a factor in generating effort and enthusiasm. One subject spoke for many 
in her follow-up interview when she said, “I spent twenty years overseas in 
the military where the quality of your relationship with colleagues determined 
whether you made it back to you quarters at night or not. Nothing is as impor-
tant as who is on your team.”
Once again, our subjects seem to have lost interest in Positional Respect as 
a source of enthusiasm and inspiration. This may be because the TCTs are disap-
pointed in the respect they actual get as teachers, and the NTCTs assume they 
will be entering their new non-teaching roles on the “ground floor”.
Notice that the quality of the Technology Environment is considerably more 
important as a motivator for enthusiasm on a day-to-day basis than it was in mo-
tivating for loyalty to staying in the profession. This may reflect the discourage-
ment teachers feel in dealing with the difficulty in getting broken equipment 
replaced or serviced in a timely manner in many districts.
11. Direct Comparisons Between Pay-Related Motivators And 
Specific non-Pay-Related Motivators
This section notes how often the two pay-related motivators were chosen 
compared to each of the six non-pay-related motivators in turn. Since a close 
correlation between the responses of TCTs and NTCTs has already been demon-
strated, we can simplify the analysis by considering all the research subjects as 
a single group. A preference for the pay-related motivator is indicated by any 
value over 50% in each binary choice. Table 5 focuses on the SATSSI motivator 
and also compares the two pay-related motivators against each other. 
When an average of all three sections of questions is considered, every oth-
er available motivator (except Performance Pay) was chosen more often than 
SATSSI and by very substantial margins. For example, Table 5 shows that both 
Job Security and Positive Challenge were chosen over SATSSI by margins of 
about 4:1. The average margin of preference for all non-pay-related motiva-
tors over SATSSI is a bit greater than 2:1 with SATSSI being chosen only 30.9% 
of the time. This confirms earlier data analysis suggesting that pay has limited 
effectiveness in motivating teachers to seek new careers, stay in teaching, or 
become better teachers.
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BInARy CHoICE BETWEEn SATSSI AnD SPECIfIC oTHER MoTIvAToRS
In QuESTIonS oPPoSIng 
SATSSI AgAInST:
PERCEnT 
CHooSIng 
SATSSI In THE 
ATTRACTIon To 
nEW CAREER 
SECTIon
PERCEnT 
CHooSIng 
SATSSI In 
THE LoyAL 
To CuRREnT 
CAREER 
SECTIon
PERCEnT 
CHooSIng 
SATSSI In THE 
EffoRT & 
EnTHuSIASM In 
CuRREnT JoB 
SECTIon
AvERAgE 
PERCEnT 
CHooSIng 
SATSSI In ALL 
SECTIonS
Performance Pay 60.00% 84.00% 80.00% 74.7%
Positional Respect 4.00% 44.00% 36.00% 28.0%
Working Environment 20.00% 52.00% 68.00% 46.7%
Technology 
Environment
48.00% 52.00% 12.00% 37.3%
Personal Meaning 20.00% 24.00% 48.00% 30.7%
Job Security 11.54% 16.00% 32.00% 19.8%
Positive Challenge 20.00% 28.00% 20.00% 22.7%
Table 5: Binary Choice between SATSSI and Specific Other Motivators
Previously, Performance Pay and SATSSI tracked fairly closely together as 
weak motivators. Now, when subjects were forced to make a choice between 
the two, SATSSI is stronger than Performance Pay with a 3:1 overall margin. The 
subjects are clearly skeptical as to whether Performance Pay would be a good 
deal for them personally overall, although we saw earlier that it has some mild 
attraction for TCTs as a potential reason to consider a new career should they 
ever waver in their commitment to teaching.  
A surprising but not unreasonable number is the 20:1 preference for Posi-
tional Respect over SATSSI in the item section concerned with attracting sub-
jects to a new career. One can just see the veteran teachers thinking: “I don’t 
care how much money I make in my next job, but I’m not putting up with this 
lack of respect anymore!”
There is an anomaly to be explained in the 2:1 preference for SATSSI over 
Positive Working Environment in the section concerned with effort and enthu-
siasm in the current job. This data point is in conflict with the considerable 
enthusiasm for the Positive Working Environment motivator everywhere else 
it appears in the data. The answer is simply a flawed item that allowed a con-
founding variable to affect the result. The item offered this pair of options:
“If my job had good pay but dull uninterested co-workers, I might stay but it 
wouldn’t get my best performance.  Slow pay growth might cause one to become 
less interested in one’s current job.”
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This study was done in the very conservative Texas Panhandle. People here 
take it as an article of faith that they are expected to rise above the ways of 
“The World” and embrace a higher standard of personal morality. To suggest 
that they might allow themselves to slack off in their responsibilities due to the 
unfortunate influence of others would not be in keeping with their collective 
self-concept. That this led to the widespread rejection of the first option was 
confirmed in the follow-up interviews.
Table 6 looks at items where the Performance Pay motivator is in direct com-
petition with each other motivator. Since we have already looked at the com-
parison of the SATSSI motivator with the Performance Pay motivator, that com-
parison will not be repeated here.
BInARy CHoICE BETWEEn PERfoRMAnCE PAy AnD SPECIfIC oTHER MoTIvAToRS
In QuESTIonS 
oPPoSIng 
PERfoRMAnCE PAy 
AgAInST:
PERCEnT 
CHooSIng 
PERfoRMAnCE 
PAy In 
ATTRACTIon To 
nEW CAREER 
SECTIon
PERCEnT 
CHooSIng 
PERfoRMAnCE 
PAy In LoyAL 
To CuRREnT 
CAREER 
SECTIon
PERCEnT 
CHooSIng 
PERfoRMAnCE 
PAy In EffoRT 
& EnTHuSIASM 
In CuRREnT JoB 
SECTIon
AvERAgE 
PERCEnT 
CHooSIng 
PERfoRMAnCE 
PAy In ALL 
SECTIonS
Positional Respect 56.00% 32.00% 53.85% 47.28%
Working Environment 24.00% 48.00% 26.92% 32.97%
Technology 
Environment
40.00% 44.00% 61.54% 48.51%
Personal Meaning 48.00% 44.00% 57.69% 49.90%
Job Security 24.00% 48.00% 30.77% 34.26%
Challenge 16.00% 20.00% 34.62% 23.54%
Table 6: Binary Choice between Performance Pay and Specific Other Motivators
This table tells a now familiar story. When all three sections are averaged, 
Performance Pay is less motivating than any other item on our list. One would 
expect the Performance Pay motivator to work best in increasing the perfor-
mance factors of effort and enthusiasm in the current job, but even here the 
results are mixed. Three of the six non-pay motivators were seen by the sub-
jects as having much greater potential influence on effort and enthusiasm than 
Performance Pay.
One apparent anomaly in the data is the relative strength of Performance 
Pay against Personal Meaning when compared to SATTSI against Personal Mean-
ing. Respondents may be assuming the possibility of a fair and empathetic ad-
ministrative system to allot Performance Pay based on keen observation. In this 
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case, receiving Performance Pay would be strong evidence that the teacher had 
a high degree of Personal Meaning which was being expressed and noticed in 
the classroom, and the two variables would be somewhat conflated.
12. Summary
Three cautions must be applied when considering this data. The first con-
cerns the idealized teacher image. The Texas Panhandle still holds on to that 
mythic model of selfless rectitude, the frontier spinster school teacher. In rural 
American culture, teaching is supposed to be a “calling” where love, pride, and 
a sense of virtue go a long way toward making up for a modest paycheck and 
limited benefits. Teachers are very much aware of this image and may have dif-
ficulty expressing how important some extra dollars might be to them at the end 
of the month, in addition to the privilege of serving ‘Our Nation’s Future’. Three 
subjects made it clear in their follow-up interviews that they were somewhat 
concerned with “looking greedy” in their survey responses.
The second caution is inherent in thinking of issues of compensation con-
ceptually, rather than numerically. We have discussed what, but not how much. 
That is inevitable in this type of discussion, since constructs like Positive Work-
ing Environment and Positional Respect cannot be quantified. Salaries can. It 
is fair to assume some subjects were thinking about the 1.2% increment they 
would be lucky to get this year when answering items about financial compen-
sation. They would certainly find 6% far more motivating as an attraction to a 
new career, a cause for loyalty to a current job, or a spur to increased effort and 
enthusiasm every day. Similarly, any performance pay scheme that adds sig-
nificant money to total compensation is going to generate much more interest 
than one that simply redistributes existing money already earmarked for salary 
increments of some type.
The final caution is that the Texas Panhandle still has a larger proportion 
of married women teaching STEM subjects than the nation as a whole. Many 
of these women, though certainly not all, provide a second income the size of 
which is not critical to their family’s welfare. This group can afford to be less 
concerned about pay.
With these reservations, the data from our group of exceptionally skilled 
and hardworking technology-oriented educators strongly suggests that neither 
higher salaries nor performance bonuses are going to attract the best candi-
dates to teaching, keep the best teachers on the job, or consistently inspire the 
highest levels of effort and enthusiasm. If our society is going to positively im-
pact student learning outcomes, we are going to have to address factors such as: 
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Positive Working Environment, Job Security, Positional Respect, Personal Mean-
ing, and Positive Challenge.
Compensation must always be adequate and equitable, and the debate about 
defining those two terms will never end, but the motivators that this study sug-
gests matter the most cannot be purchased with dollars. Determining how to 
improve the local levels of the abstract, but very real, motivators of teaching 
excellence examined in this study may be the greatest challenge schools will 
face in the years ahead.
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